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ABSTRACT The Australian aged care industry was once dominated by non-profit 
organisations but recently ownership has changed significantly with the entry of for profit 
and in particular private equity investment. This paper provides an overview of the main 
players in the Australian aged care sector The analysis is framed within the literature which 
examines the relationship between ownership type and the quality of community services. This 
paper contributes to existing literature by providing evidence to the theoretical underpinnings 
behind the encroachment of market provision of formerly non-profit oriented services We 
present results from a wider study which suggest that a change of ownership from non-profit 
to private equity may have significant consequences for the quality of service provision. The 
ownership changes in the aged care sector are symptomatic of the challenges facing 
Australian policymakers in coping with its ageing population. 
 




The proportion of the Australian population aged 65 and over has increased in all regions over 
the last 20 years, from 11.0% in June 1989 to 13.3% in June 2009 (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 2009). According to both Australian Treasury and Productivity Commission 
estimates, this trend is about to significantly accelerate as the baby boomer generation retires. 
This development poses major policy challenges as state and federal governments face the 
difficult and urgent task of finding the most effective way to meet the inevitable soaring 
demand for aged care services. This paper discusses current policy approaches to address the 
issue, in particular those directed at increasing the level of corporatisation and marketisation 
in human services. The paper briefly discusses these policies in the broader context of 
successive governments’ commitment to neo-liberalism and its faith in the capacity of 
markets to solve significant social and economic challenges.  The paper then looks at some of 
the effects of this approach and in particular how a move from supply side to demand side 
subsidies has created a lucrative market in aged care provision which has lured more and 
more commercial entities into sector. This in turn has resulted in a pronounced shift in the 
ownership of aged care services in Australia away from the once dominant non-profit 
organisations to for profit and in particular private equity run businesses.  We investigate this 
development, in particular the entry of private equity into the aged care industry. We then 
discuss some of the possible implications changes in ownership may have for the 
management and sustainability of service provision for the elderly. To conclude we point out 
several possibilities in the future direction of research in this area and we question the 
potential of profit-making motivations to undermine and cloud the task of providing quality 
aged care.  
 
The policy challenge and the government’s neoliberal inspired response 
In 2000 the Productivity Commission found that government spending on long term aged care 
in Australia was just over 1 percent ($6 billion) of GDP per year. In 2007 the Treasury 
projected that this will increase by an average 2 per cent a year over the next 40 years 
(Australian Treasury 2007). 
Insert Figure 1: Projections of Australian Government spending by category 
Government has approached this serious challenge to fund aged care into the future through 
providing incentives for greater use of “managed” markets. The underlying principle is the 
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belief that competition results in improved outcomes such as greater efficiency, higher quality 
of service, a clearer focus on customers and better value for money. This is part of a broader 
international trend with similar policy approaches being adopted throughout the developed 
world for example Harris (2003) and Jordan (2000) on Britain, Reichard & Wollmann (199) 
on Germany, and Reisch & Gambrill (1997) on USA. These policies are inspired by a 
worldview generally referred to as neo-liberalism. 
 
Neo-liberal perspectives have increasingly dominated the economic theories that inform the 
political and social policies of developed nations (Murray, 1984; Marsland, 1996; Jamrozik, 
2006, p. 7). Since the Global Financial Crisis there has been much criticism of neo-liberalism 
but little change in terms of the ‘free market’ approach (Pusey, 2009). 
 
The fundamental position of neo-liberalism is small government and market solutions. Its 
main features are: 
• deregulated markets and workforces that should allow free enterprise to flourish and 
thereby  increase economic growth which ultimately should benefit all; 
• reduced public expenditure on social services such as health, education and welfare; 
• privatisation of state-owned enterprises, utilities and services which in the hands of the 
‘market’ should be run more efficiently and effectively free from the potential corruption 
and divisive influences of political pressure groups; and 
• the reframing of concepts such as  ‘the public good’ and ‘community’ into  ideas that 
involve individualism’, ‘individual responsibility’ and ‘mutual obligation’ (Robbins, 
1999, Martinez & Garcia, 2000).  
 
Since the first neoliberal policies were foreshadowed, fierce debate has arisen regarding their 
consequences. Essentially, proponents believe that the market is ‘the only legitimate allocator 
of goods and services in society at large’ (Battin, 1991: 296) and should be ‘the major 
coordinating mechanism in the Australian economy’ (Norton, 1995: 228). Whilst the central 
concern of neoliberal critics is its effects on wealth distribution and the consequent social 
fallout. The common observation is that ‘the rich grow richer and the poor grow poorer’ 




Governments have long touted the benefits of competition between service providers stating 
that it was improving responsiveness and client focus (Lewis et al 1996). However, in terms 
of social and community welfare, strong arguments can be stated against the benefits of 
competition. In the first instance there is no genuine competitive market. Instead the markets 
are purely a construct of the government departments funding and consequently and are more 
accurately described as ‘quasi markets’ (Ashton & Press, 1997; Shackley & Healey, 1993). 
Moreover, because competition for limited government funds occurs between service 
organisations such competition has a negative impact on some of the longstanding 
cooperative and transparent practices that have existed among some community services. 
Such cooperation is often itself a factor in cost saving and capacity building in the sector 
(Bergman, 1998; Council on the Ageing [COTA] 1997; Morrow, Bartlett & Silaghi, 2007).  
Finally, a more general observation is that the effects of the ‘quasi market’ have contributed 
to an increasing lack of ‘human-ness’ in caring for people and communities (Allen & Potten, 
1998; Keating, 1997).  
 
To mitigate against these negative effects there is a case for governments to foster and fund 
non-profit community services over for profit organisations. This is because of the absence of 
distributional and opportunistic profit making constraints that often occur in for-profit care 
and which can result in a lower quality of service (Hansmann, 1980, 1987 and more recently 
Comondore et al 2009). This is especially pertinent in aged care provision, where the relatives 
and friends of elderly clients are unable to closely monitor the level of care quality clients 
receive. In the language of economics this market is characterised by a high level of 
information asymmetry. According to Hansmann: 
“The non-profit producer, like its for-profit counterpart, has the capacity to raise 
prices and cut quality in such cases [of informational asymmetries] without much fear 
of customer reprisal; however, it lacks the incentive to do so because those in charge 
are barred from taking home any resulting profits. In other words, the advantage of a 
non-profit producer is that the discipline of the market is supplemented by the 
additional protection given the consumer by another, broader ‘contract’, the 
organization’s legal commitment to devote its entire earning to the production of 
services.” (1980:844) 
 
Comondore et al (2009) tabulated previous studies that compared private for-profit and 
private not-for-profit nursing home quality of care (2009: 4-5) and their own study found: 
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“…systematic review and meta-analysis of the evidence suggests that, on average, not-
for-profit nursing homes deliver higher quality care than do for-profit nursing homes. 
Many factors may, however, influence this relation in the case of individual institutions.” 
(2009: 1) 
 
This situation notwithstanding, State and Federal Governments continue to pursue policies 
directed at the marketisation of community services, particularly in aged care services. 
 
Corporatisation of Australian aged care provision  
Traditionally the bulk of aged care in Australia was provided by families, with the principal 
carer in the vast majority of cases being female, usually the daughter or daughter-in-law of the 
aging person (NATSEM, 2004). There were also some formal aged care providers and prior 
to 1956 all of these were non-profit organisations (Braithwaite 2001).  
 
In recent decades the aged care landscape has changed significantly. Fine and Stephens 
(1998) describe the change as a major shift in the locus of care responsibilities from informal 
family based care to formal aged care services. Demographic changes have been key drivers 
in this shift. Since World War II, changes in attitudes, lifestyle and the presence of women in 
the paid workforce have affected the supply of informal family based care arrangements. At 
the same time the demand for care from qualified professionals has continued to grow due to 
the aging of the population. 
 
In response Australian governments have created an aged care market to resolve shortfalls in 
the supply of aged and related community services. In this context the provision of incentives in 
the form of government subsidies was partially based on a desire to encourage private 
investment in the provision of care services. As a result governments have adopted an extensive 
demand-side subsidy regime where governments move away from subsidising supply to 
subsidising demand aged care inputs. The demand-side subsidy regime has promoted 
corporatisation of the sector by creating an Australian aged care market that offers private 
investors the prospect of healthy returns. For example according to Australian investment 
banking house, Macquarie Bank, around 70% of the operating income in aged care comes from 
the Commonwealth government (MCAG 2007). Thus, this strategy has lead to the increased 
involvement of for-profit players in aged care and more recently the entry of private equity , 
that is investment vehicles generally owned by institutional investors and where the shares of 
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these vehicles are not publicly traded on a stock exchange and are therefore not subject to 
statutory disclosure requirements. METHODOLOGY 
This piece of research was conducted as part of a wider study investigating the ownership, 
management and structure of organisations in the aged care sector. The data presented here 
are based on two stages of data collection. The first stage consisted of a collection and 
analysis of secondary sources based on organisation websites, annual reports, Australian 
Stock Exchange (ASX) announcements, the Dun&Bradstreet business database and Who’s 
Who in Business in Australia. The second stage consisted of conducting phone and email 
interviews with representatives from aged care organisations. Discourse analysis was used to 
draw out the main themes of the written and verbal text (Silverman, 2000) in relation to the 
change in ownership and for the drivers for involvement in the industry. The bulk of the data 
was collected over a period of six months in late 2006 with subsequent changes in ownership 
of aged care organisations noted until 2009.The following section describes the analysis from 




Ownership in the Aged Care Sector 
In 2007 there were sixteen significant aged care providers in Australia. They are identified in 
Table 1.  
 
Insert TABLE 1 here 
 
The providers of aged care services outlined in this table cover the main types of ownership of 
aged services in this country. From this table, three distinct ownership types for aged care 
organisations can be recognized.  Firstly, the traditional non-profit organization which are 
usually faith-based with a long history and presence in the industry.  Secondly, the 
traditional for-profit organization of which there are only three. This is due to the rapid 
acquisitions that have occurred whereby some of the traditional for-profit organisations have 
become part of the third type of organisation, the private equity owners. These organisations 
have emerged over the last 5 years to become important players in the aged care industry.  
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The Traditional Non-profit Organization: Charity and Religious Based 
From Table 1, seven organisations were identified as fitting the traditional non-profit category 
of organization.  All are charitable and faith based organisations. Two of the organisations are 
affiliated with the Catholic Church.  One of the Uniting Church’s subsidiaries is Frontier 
Services, which is the main aged care operator in rural Australia. This is illustrated in Table 2 
below. 
 
Insert Table Two about here 
 
These organisations were founded on the Christian precept of charity. The following email 
excerpt from a Uniting Church representative explains this responsibility: 
Caring for people has been a principal Christian activity for 2,000+ years. Churches 
ran the world’s first orphanages, hospitals, schools, universities and hotels. In the 20th 
Century, Churches pioneered the care of older people. The first services provided 
specifically for older people were accommodation-type services for homeless older 
men or women. The development of these services primarily came from action at the 
local congregation or parish level. The services represented the efforts of local faith 
communities to respond to the needs that they saw around them in their local 
communities, in acting out their Christian ministry. (personal correspondence, 10 
January 2007). 
 
In 2004, the Salvation Army as an organisation faced a triage situation selling  fifteen of its 
nineteen aged care homes to Retirement Care Australia, part of the Macquarie Group, due to 
the increased financial costs of operating in the sector: 
“…the need in aged care, while being great and very demanding, is not as great as the 
desperate need for those living below the poverty line (Knight 2004). 
 
In late 2006, the St. Vincent de Paul Society announced their intention of selling eighteen of 
their twenty aged care homes, citing: 
The shortage of both high- and low-care places in many areas, coupled with the 
cessation of capital grants and an emphasis on user pays has resulted in a lack of 
available services in regions that the Society has identified as having significant 
numbers of people with little or no assets and who are in need of residential aged care 
(Vinnies, 2007).  
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It is evident that the increased competition in the industry is causing the traditional values-
based operators from the non-profit sector to relinquish their involvement in aged care to the 
private equity players.  
 
The Traditional For-Profit Organization 
The three companies in table 1 designated as traditional for-profit organisations have been in 
the aged care sector for the last 30 years. Two are listed on the Australian Stock Exchange – 
Aevum and Ramsay. The other, the Moran Healthcare Group, is unlisted and is family owned. 
Table 3 (below) provides an overview of these companies according to their current asset 
valuation.  
 
Insert Table Three about here 
 
Ramsay Healthcare 
Ramsay Healthcare (RHC) was founded in 1964 by Paul Ramsay and is now the biggest 
private hospital provider in the country and the largest market-listed corporation in this 
industry. Ramsay Healthcare acquired 4 aged care facilities from Ellis Aged Care at a cost of 
$38.5M in April 2005. In March 2005, Ramsay Healthcare acquired Gracedale Private 
Nursing Home for $9.8M. Lastly, Home Care Services (HCS) was acquired by Ramsay in 
April 2005 for $1.5M. HCS is one of the largest commercial residential homecare businesses 




Aevum was formally known as the Hibernian Friendly Society. In its previous form it was a 
Catholic society established to assist Irish Catholics in funeral and sickness benefits in 
colonial Australia. It opened its first retirement village in 1973 and is now the largest for-
profit operator in NSW. The society demutualised in 2002 and listed on the Australian Stock 
Exchange in 2004. In 2004, a takeover bid was made by Primelife. A significant owner of 
Primelife is the private equity group, Babcock & Brown. This bid was rejected. In 2006, 
Primelife increased its shareholding in Aevum to 39%. In August 2006, Aevum bought 





This Group was established  in1956 by Doug and Greta Moran and is run by members of the 
Moran Family. The group was Australia’s largest private aged care provider. In August 2005, 
Macquarie Group’s Retirement Care Australia acquired 12 Aged Care Facilities from Moran 
Healthcare for $186M (Macquarie, 2005). A year later, the Aevum transaction occurred in 
Western Australia. In October 2006, AMP’s Principal Aged Care entered into an agreement to 
purchase the leases and operations of 39 residential aged care homes from Moran Health Care 
Group for $129.3M. 
 
From this brief overview of the for-profit companies two trends are evident. The first is the 
increasing consolidation trend which is coupled with a chain-management approach. The 
second is the recent entry of private equity investment which has resulted in varying degrees 
of hybrid management arrangements.  
 
The New Business Model For-Profit Organization or Private Equity Owners 
The “new” owners in the aged care industry can be characterized by the ownership structure 
and investment horizon of their corporate entity: “private equity”. As the name suggests, the 
shares of private equity entities – unlike their publicly listed counterparts – are not listed and 
are held in private hands - such as wealthy individuals, families and or listed/unlisted 
institutions. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) provide a definition: 
Private equity investing is typically carried out through a limited partnership (LP) 
structure in which the private equity firm serves as the general partner (GP). The LPs 
consist largely of institutional investors and wealthy individuals who provide the bulk 
of the capital…The GP then has an agreed time period in which to invest the 
committed capital—usually on the order of 5 years. The GP also has an agreed time 
period in which to return capital to the LPs—usually on the order of 10–12 years in 
total. Each fund or limited partnership, therefore, is essentially a closed end fund with 
a finite life (2005: 1793). 
 
However, private equity’s march up to and leading to the global financial crisis of 2008 was 
not without its critics. The quote below is from the global union federation, the UNI Global 
Union’s general secretary Philip Jennings speaking to private equity’s business leaders at the 
World Econonic Forum’s annual 2007 summit in Davos, Switzerland: 
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“Your philosophy is buy it, strip it and flip it…At a time when we are looking for 
companies to be more transparent you are taking corporate governance underground. 
Does this mean you have abandoned any sense of broader responsibilities?”- 
Jennings (2007) 
 
Due to the nature of private equity investing, aged care facilities are seen as part of a portfolio 
of assets. Therefore, the performance of this portfolio depends not just on the profitability of 
the aged care facilities but on the other assets in that same portfolio. Aged care facilities may 
be placed in the same portfolio as airports, roads and other ‘similar-stable’ assets and 
promoted and sold to selected investors as one ‘infrastructure’ fund. Ownership changes 
occur quickly while existing day-to-day management structures of the facilities may remain 
constant. Fund managers may be appointed to the board of directors. Generally, the fund 
managers belong to a division or subsidiary owned by a bigger organization.  
 
Insert table 4 about here 
 
Table 4 provides an overview of the companies listed in this category. Five of the six 
organisations identified in this sample are based in Australia, with the European-American 
consortium CVC (CAID) being the exception. All have acquired pre-existing aged care 
facilities from traditional non-profit and/or for-profit organisations. All six private equity 
owners are part of publicly listed entities.  
 
Below is a brief overview of four of these players and their motivations for involvement in the 
aged care sector.  Attention is then focused on the recent instability in global financial 
markets which raises questions about the stability of provision for community services, 




Principal Aged Care owns 42 aged care homes around Australia. In October 2006, Principal 
Aged Care entered into an agreement to purchase the leases and operations of 39 residential 
aged care homes from Moran Health Care Group for $129.3M. 
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In January 2008, Principal bought Domain Aged Care making the group Australia’s largest 
owner of for-profit aged care with more than 5000 operational beds in 58 facilities. AMP 
stated that the key investment reasons for this expansion were: 
• low volatility and growing cash flows from accommodation bonds, which are attached 
to 60 per cent of all beds;  
• stable revenues underpinned by regulated Government funding;  
• substantial freehold property portfolio in Queensland, Victoria and NSW, providing 
development, structuring and portfolio enhancement opportunities; and  
• sound track record of acquiring and developing high quality new facilities on time and 
on budget. (AMP 2008) 
 
Principal Care is owned by a consortium of institutional funds, of which AMP Capital 
Investors manages 95.5% (Principal Care, 2006). AMP Capital Investors is the fund 
management arm of AMP, managing over $97B for investors. From 1995-2005, the fund 
delivered an average 16.3% return to investors and in 2005 the Infrastructure Equity Fund of 
AMP Capital had $2.6B assets under management (December 2005 figures). To participate in 
the fund requires a minimum investment of $10M. The fund is divided into three areas 
dealing with origination (establishing infrastructure deals), asset management and portfolio 
management. The fund invests in three key sectors; Utilities, Transport and Social 
Infrastructure (Principal Healthcare falls under this category). In October 2005, Chief AMP 
Economist Shane Oliver reported that amongst the different infrastructure project types 
available, Social Infrastructure Funds may expect an income yield of 8-10% with an average 
return of 11% for 5-10 years (Oliver, 2005).  
AMP Capital has Principal Healthcare marked as a mature investment in the portfolio life 
cycle and it is therefore in the exit stage of the investment lifecycle. This raises serious 
implications for the future availability of funds for Principal Healthcare.  
 
Craigcare / Hastings Funds Management / Westpac 
 
Acquired by Westpac Bank in 2007, Hastings Funds Management is self-described as ‘one of 
the largest managers of infrastructure and alternative investments in Australia’(HFM, 2007). 
Hastings acquired Craigcare in 2003, a West Australian aged care operator of 16 aged care 
facilities since the 1970s. Craigcare became part of the Hastings Private Equity Fund. In 
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2006, the group triumphantly proclaimed, “Hastings exited its investment in Craigcare in late 




Ibis Care has been in the sector since 1997 operating three facilities in NSW and Tasmania. In 
March 2006, IBIS Care Holdings Pty Ltd was bought by ANZ Capital with the deal 
originating with ANZ’s Aged Care Division Corporate Banking. The equity came from ANZ 
Capital and the debt was financed by ANZ Corporate Banking. The deal was formed under 
ANZ’s Capital Acquisition and Development Funding. At the time of ANZ’s purchase, the 
financial orientation of the investment was uppermost: 
 “ANZ is pleased to provide IBIS Care with access to investment-banking solutions 
that are historically only available for Wall Street-sized firms (Read, 2006) 
 
 
Retirement Care Australia 
 
Retirement Care Australia (RCA) owns and operates nineteen aged care centres across the 
country. RCA acquired fourteen aged care facilities from The Salvation Army in July 2005. In 
December 2005, RCA acquired 12 aged care centres from the Moran Health Care Group. 
Macquarie Capital Alliance Group Ltd. (MCAG) owns 98% of RCA. Tricare owns the 
remaining 2%. MCAG also has a 49% shareholding in the Zig Inge Group (ZIG) which runs 
16 retirement villages on the East Coast of Australia. MCAG is an arm of the investment 
bank, Macquarie Group. MCAG also listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. RCA and ZIG 
join a stable of Macquarie infrastructure assets. MCAG securities were not available to the 
public, instead they were offered to certain institutional investors (including offshore and 
onshore institutions), and existing Macquarie shareholders. 
 
MCAG lists the aged care industry in Australia within their five most promising industries 
(Macquarie, 2007). The MCAG justify their investment in RCA on the basis that it is a 
predictable revenue stream with strong growth prospects. According to MCAG: 
the aged care industry provides stable underlying revenue streams and predictable 
cash flows, primarily from government funding and subsidies” (Macquarie, 2007a). 
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Additionally, they cite the long-standing management experience of the personnel gained 
when they acquired facilities from The Salvation Army and The Moran Group Moreover, this 
experience and knowledge enables them to ‘participate in further consolidation and 
acquisitions’ in the profitable aged care industry. This suggests that the primary goal for 
entering into the aged care industry is profit which MCAG can make all the more secure 
through industry domination. (Macquarie, 2007b).  
Subsidising ‘Private Equity’ Investment? 
Citing dela Rama’s submission to the Senate Inquiry into Private Equity Investment, Senator 
Ursula Stephens (Hansard 2007: E84) noted: 
unlike other areas where private equity investment tends to be high risk and 
speculative, this is an area of economic activity that is in essence underwritten by 
government subsidies and will continue to be because of the nature of aged care 
provision. 
 
This suggests that government is the underwriter of last resort and the taxpayer is the ultimate 
creditor. The global financial crisis has reinforced this view of government’s role as 




The Global Financial Crisis has seen the investment banking model somewhat discredited 
with the spectacular collapses or organizational restructuring of the same Wall Street-sized 
firms. This raises questions regarding the effects of policies that have facilitated and 
encouraged entry of those whose usual business is speculative investments.7 
  
The final column in Table 4 (above) indicates the short-term nature of the private equity 
investment in the aged care industry with the sale of Citigroup’s aged care investment only a 
                                                 
7 While it is beyond the scope of this paper, the parallels between the issues faced by the aged care sector and 
childcare sector are striking. With the fallout from the collapse of ABC Learning still fresh in the child care 
sector; those watching the aged care sector with its funding similarities are arguably entitled to ask: “What type 
of financial guarantee does the Government have available for rescuing aged care homes when their operational 
viability may be undermined by the current economic conditions?” The findings of the 2009 Senate Inquiry into 
Childcare are pertinent to the future of the Australian aged care sector especially deficiencies in the policy arena 
and belated response by government once market failure in the childcare sector had already occurred. See Senate 
(2009) Report into the Provision of Childcare, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations 
[DEEWR] References Committee, Commonwealth of Australia 
http://www.aph.gov.au/SEnate/committee/eet_ctte/child_care/report/report.pdf accessed 13 January 2010 
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year after its purchase of DCA Group. Citigroup sold on this interest to BUPA for around 
$1.225B. By comparison, the Government budget for the whole industry is only $8.6B a year. 
This suggests that some of the market valuation for aged care entities is optimistic at best or at 
worst inflated.  This again raises the following difficult and critical questions.  Should multi-
billion dollar entities, which have greater financial leverage and scope than the Federal 
Government, be allowed to continue to access subsidies in the aged care sector? Are these 
subsidies being used for their intended purpose of benefiting the aged or are they the means 
by which owners of aged care facilities can increase returns to their shareholders or unit 
holders? Finally and more fundamentally, who in our community really benefits from the 
neoliberal market policies that are applied to the funding of community services? 
 
The reliance on government subsidies is such that in the 2007 Financial Report of Macquarie 
Capital Alliance Group (the parent of operator Retirement Care Australia now known as 
Regis) noted that such reliance is a source of credit risk: 
At the group level, there are no significant considerations of credit risk. However 
certain subsidiaries have concentrations of credit exposure as follows: 
A significant proportion of the day-to-day receipts of Retirement Care Australia 
Holdings (RCAH) are sourced from the Commonwealth Government (MCAG, 2007) 
 
Later in the same document, MCAG’s Financial Risk Management reiterated this risk for the 
group and made the following statement about its management.  
 
In each case, the creditworthiness of the counterparties mitigates the risk associated 
with the concentration of exposure to one counterparty…The Group has policies in 
place to ensure that cash deposits are appropriately spread between counterparties 
with acceptable credit ratings (MCAG, 2007). 
 
The above excerpts suggest that according to the risk management strategies of these new 
entrants, there is a certain preparedness to face risk, if and when it is realized.  
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As a two-tiered system in aged care has now evolved with the increased marketisation, – or 
arguably, the commodification8, – of the industry, then perhaps a two-tiered system of 
distribution of subsidies would better reflect the current commercial reality. 
 
Private ownership 
According to Young and Salaman (2002) among the reasons the non-profit sector has 
experienced pressures to commercialise, is the ‘expanded demand’ of an aging population. In 
the Australian Treasury’s Intergenerational Report (2010), the ageing population with climate 
change have been highlighted as the major, immediate challenges facing the country. The 
increasing demands of an ageing population and the incentive of government subsidies have 
produced increased competition between for-profit providers for larger and larger stakes in 
the sector, with particularly increased activity from private equity players. There are several 
potential issues identified with this change in ownership. Firstly, the situation can enable 
instances of private profiteering from public funds. Government subsidies in the aged care 
industry create attractive investment opportunities for investment funds looking for a low risk 
venture. Secondly, there are issues regarding the effects this may have on the quality of 
service provision (Luksetich et al., 2000). Private equity funds require a ‘return on 
investment’ which opens the possibility that this may be valued above the ‘quality of care’ 
criteria.  
 
Private equity is also a bull market phenomenon and the proliferation of these investment 
groups in the aged care sector is there as long as there is a heavily liquid market In late 2007 
and 2008, the credit crisis in the USA triggered a worldwide bear market that has stemmed 
investment flows. Hence the fickle nature of private equity’s investment horizons may be 
incompatible with an industry which requires long-term and sustained investment.  
 
While some investment companies are moving in the direction of ‘ethical investment’ the 
large majority of private investment firms involved in the aged care industry  in Australia are 
looking for a low risk, steady return investment opportunity to ‘hedge’ some of the higher risk 
ventures in their portfolios. 
 
                                                 
8 The commodification of the industry was a comment made at a Paid Care Symposium held at the University of 
Sydney in December 2009. 
 17 
The significance of ownership 
As the short-term investment horizons of some for-profit entities in recent years have shown, 
who owns and controls the aged care entity is as important as those who run and manage the 
delivery of care.  The stability of ownership arrangements ultimately impacts on the stability 
and quality of service provision. Luksetich et.al (2000) following Weisbrod (1988) argued 
that ownership and the associated managerial behaviour differs between non-profit and for-
profit organisations, in areas where there is asymmetry between buyers and sellers and the 
quality of the service is difficult to evaluate. This is the case in the aged care sector . Such 
views note that those in non-profit organisations are more likely to be driven by altruistic 
motivations whereas for-profits organisations are more likely to engage in ‘opportunistic 
skimping’ on aspects of quality not easily monitored (Morris & Helpburn, 2000). Furthermore 
the ‘agency costs’ associated with large scale chain ventures operating in many locations are 
situations where managers are more likely to serve their own self interests rather than those of 
the organisation (Luksetich, 2000).  
 
In relation to the corporatisation and marketisation of the health care systems Wynne made 
the observation that in the USA corporate interests ‘encourage resources to be diverted from 
patient care to meet market priorities’ (Wynne 2004, p.4). Market obligations induce 
practitioners to serve business missions at the expense of their duty of care for their patients. 
Furthermore, Wynne (2004) cites Australian evidence where this is associated with cases of 
fraud, misconduct and malpractice. While Wynne is referring to the health care system, the 
examination of the aged care industry in this study demonstrates that there is reason for 
concern. The evidence suggests not only an emerging domination by the marketisation forces 
of private equity, but also the incorporation of these assets into portfolios whereby aged care 
facilities are managed as chains and valued as a stable return. It is reasonable to question the 
likelihood of incentive for profit maximisation at the expense of care provisions and even 
managerial profits due to the opportunities of agency costs.  
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Private equity players have transformed and are transforming the aged care industry, as they 
continue to acquire non-profit providers. Those non-profits that remain must compete against 
corporations with significantly greater resources and arguably have greater influence in the 
formation of future policy agendas.  
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The shift in ownership in the aged care industry raises several questions requiring further 
investigation For example, is there a difference in service provision between those private 
non-listed for-profits ‘new players’ and the ‘older’ publicly listed more established for-profit 
organisations? Of particular interest should be understanding the way in which government 
subsidies act as a lure for equity investors looking  for investment security and the consequent 
effects this orientation has on the quality of service provision.  
 
Another area that needs scrutiny is the difference in the financial valuation of nursing homes 
by private equity as compared to nonprofit operators. Can a more realistic (and even a market) 
valuation of a nursing homes by nonprofit owners include the incorporation of intangibles and 
goodwill? How can the assessment of quality translate into a better financial management for 
a nonprofit run home for aged people? 
 
While there has been a growth in ‘hybrid’ organisations that mix the profit market principles 
with the social values of nonprofit missions, there has been little research examining “how 
mission-driven business enterprise models structure themselves to allay the tension between 
social mission and commercial goals or the specific mechanisms of mission drift” (Cooney, 
2006:144). In particular we ask: does a change in ownership impact upon the governance and 
practices of an aged care organisation? Furthermore, does private equity investment in aged 
care services in Australia lead to changes in management? And where management remains 
stable, but the ownership changes, how does this change impact upon the staff and their 
service provision for older persons?  
 
Alternatively, could we find that variations in efficiency and quality of service provision are 
more likely to exist within ownership types and are dependent upon, managerial practices, 
(Morris and Helburn, 2000), or the existence of chain structures (Luksetich, 2000), or the 
stringency of government imposed regulation (Morris & Helburn, 2000; Luksetich, 2000)? 
 
This paper contributes to the literature by providing evidence showing significant 
organisational, ideological and managerial upheavals in the sector with the encroachment of 
market provision of formerly non-profit oriented services, 
 
By highlighting the issues we have raised that private ownership and private equity players 
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are increasingly entering the aged care field this paper, this paper should alert those concerned 
with the quality of service delivery to the elderly and have them view the aged care sector 
with continuous and close vigilance. 
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 Figure 1: Projections of Australian Government spending by category 
 
Source: Australian Treasury (2007) Projections and assumptions. 
Table 1: List of 16 Aged Care Organisations studied in 2007 
Organization Organisational Type Year of Entry in Sector 
Anglicare Australia Nonprofit 1857  
Aevum Traditional For-Profit 1868 as a Catholic charity, 
1973 for first retirement 
village 
Baptist Community Care Nonprofit 1944 
Craigcare  New Model For-profit 1970s 
DCA Group New Model For-Profit 1987 
Ibis Care New Model For-Profit 1997 (by phone) 
Little Company of Mary 
Healthcare 
Nonprofit 1885 
Masonic Homes Nonprofit 1890s 
Moran Traditional For-Profit 1956 
Primelife New Model For-Profit 1986 
Principal Care New Model For-Profit 1998 
Ramsay Traditional For-Profit 1964 
Retirement Care Australia New Model For- 2005 
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Profit 
Salvation Army Nonprofit 1900s 
St. Vincent de Paul Nonprofit 1967 in Victoria website 
Uniting Care Australia Nonprofit 1928 
 
Table 2: Top 10 Aged Care Operators in Australia in 20029 








Nonprofit 82 4,819 3.4% 
Moran Health 
Care 
Private 48 3,90010 2.8% 
Uniting Church 
(QLD) 
Nonprofit 57 3,021 2.1% 




Nonprofit 16 1,671 1.2% 
Amity/DCA Aged 
Care 
Private 21 1,603 1.2% 
Uniting Church 
(OLD Synod) 
Nonprofit 27 1,576 1.1% 
Conform Group Private 22 1,560 1.1% 




Nonprofit 23 1,440 1.0% 
 
Table 3: List of Traditional For-Profit Organisations in the Sector 
“Traditional For-profit” Business 
Company Year of Listing (ASX Code) Market Capitalisation (as at 
                                                 
9 Amity Group 2002 Annual Report 
10 The 2005 figure is 3,379 beds (see Operations). However, Moran Health Care is a private company and the 
number of beds could vary due to the paucity of information. 
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9/1/07) or Revenues 
Aevum 2004 (AVE) $266M market capitalization 
Moran Unlisted $150M estimated revenues 
Ramsay 1997 (RHC) $1.98B market capitalization 
 
Table 4: List of ‘New Business Model’ For-Profit Organization 
“New Business Model For-profit”: Private Equity Owners 




Year Acquired or 
Established (Exited) 
Craigcare Hastings Funds 
Management 
Westpac 2003 (2006) 
DCA Group CAID Pty Ltd CVC & 
Citigroup 
2006 
(exited 2007 to BUPA) 
Ibis Care ANZ Capital ANZ Bank 2006 



















2005 (partial exit in 2008) 
 
 
